CRITICAL CONCERNS

TAXPAYER RISK
ECONOMIC IMPACT & TAXPAYER BURDEN

TRAVEL DEMAND
FREIGHT MOVEMENT & CONGESTION



SAFETY
SEISMIC READINESS & COLLISIONS

ALTERNATIVES
OPTIONS TO MEET OUR REGION'S NEEDS

CRC FACTS

I. Executive Overview

In 2005 Oregon and Washington began a process to identify the key needs for re-designing five miles of freeway and interchanges including the Interstate 5 Bridge, which was built in two phases in 1917 and 1958. In 2013 the Oregon legislature voted to support a bi-state proposal in which the costs, risk, and management experience were shared with Washington state. Later in 2013, the Washington legislature failed to support the project.

Losing this partner raises many questions for the future of the project.

The 2014 legislative assembly will be asked to support a new $2.8 billion plan in which Oregon alone would shoulder full financial, legal, planning, management, and execution responsibilities for the project. Many Oregon leaders saw the original proposal to build a multi-state project as a

Why should Oregon go it alone on the most expensive public project in recent history?

Document Structure

This report includes an overview of the critical interests behind the last several years of planning and project development for the CRC.

SOURCES AND DATA

We believe that starting with clear data and shared interests is the key to a successful regional transportation and public transit plan.

One of the most significant obstacles to providing a non-biased review of any part for this project is that much of the proposal is not based on measured facts, but on projections: Guesses, models, and assumptions about future human behavior.

In general, information for this report was drawn from the CRC's commissioned research and data, from ODOT, or from regional news outlets.

Voting against "Oregon Only" does not close the door on a new bridge, or other alternatives.

significant risk. For these leaders and scores of new concerned leaders, this proposal to "go it alone" represents the same initial risks, with increased financial risk and no new or additional benefits for the state of Oregon. Going forward, Oregon taxpayers would take on at least $1.6 billion in additional loan and bond obligations for the new "Oregon Only" plan. This number would increase if costs run over, if toll revenues fall short, or if Federal grants and loans are not fully funded.

After concluding this review of the available data, we urge legislators to vote against the current "Oregon Only" option. It does not meet many of the most important interests of Oregon voters, and it exposes Oregon taxpayers to avoidable financial risk. Alternative proposals and concepts offer meaningful advantages over the current CRC proposal, yet they have not been fully explored by the legislature.

Voting against the "Oregon Only" option does not close the door on a new bridge, or on addressing concerns of safety, freight and commuter mobility, transit options, mixed-use development, and prudent fiscal planning.

Critical Interests

1. HIGH TAXPAYER RISK

The new "Oregon Only" proposal introduces new costs and new risks to Oregon tax payers. It is not clear from the CRC's financial plan that the toll revenue for the project will be sufficient and timely to pay both the amortization of the bond debt for the bridge and also the high costs of operating the bridge tolling system.

The CRC's financial plan relies on assumptions about three things: (1) ability to contain costs during construction, (2) federal support, and (3) revenue from tolling. The most recent financial statements from ODOT show a plan to spend $2.79 billion on the project, and a plan to raise $2.71 billion, showing an $86 million dollar shortfall. The back-up plan, if costs are higher than anticipated, or if Federal grants, loans, or tolling (or all three) are lower than anticipated, is to increase tolls, reduce or eliminate other transportation projects in the state, and to raise taxes.

2. TRAVEL DEMAND LOWER THAN PROJECTED

Estimates of travel demand for both commercial and non-commercial vehicles have changed since the original case was made for this project. Original estimates of travel demand were based on a ten-year period, from 1995-2005, of increasing daily traffic averages on the bridge. Original projections showed average daily traffic increasing to 184,000 vehicles in 2036. That projected level of growth raised concerns about increased congestion, wait times and collisions on and around the I-5 bridge.

However, as has been recently revealed in the state-commissioned Investment Grade Analysis, those traffic projections were incorrect. Travel demand has declined in Oregon and around the nation since 2005, even excluding the effects of the recession. This multi-year national trend is unlikely to reverse.

The original incorrect projections were the basis for the design, financial plan, and environmental impact assessment for the CRC. *These new data invalidate the core transportation argument for the project.*

New Data Reveals Lower Demand

[Source: CRC Tolling Studies & RTC Traffic Studies]



Travel demand has declined in Oregon and around the nation since 2005.

Original Travel Estimates	Current Estimates
Based on a 2005 current traffic analysis, traffic was estimated to increase steadily to more than 178,000 in 2030.	Since 2005, traffic decreased instead of increasing. Planners are no longer sure that the original estimates are a good basis for predicting travel demand through the corridor.
The CRC originally projected marginal reduction in traffic due to tolling on the I-5 bridge.	Based on investment grade analysis from CRC's consulting firm, CDM Smith, tolling will reduce travel on the I-5 bridge by as much as 76,000 vehicles per day in 2022.
Original estimates projected no significant travel diversion to the I-205 corridor.	Based on CDM Smith's report, travel reduced on the I-5 bridge will increase travel on I-205 by as much at 39,500 vehicles per day.

3. SAFETY

COLLISIONS TIED TO CONGESTION

The CRC project has identified two levels of concern for traffic: (1) **Current issues** with collisions due to congestion and outdated highway design, and accessibility for pedestrians and cyclists, and (2) The **potential increased rate of collisions** due to projections of increased traffic congestion.

SEISMIC READINESS AND STRUCTURAL SOUNDNESS

The CRC questions the I-5 bridge's ability to withstand a major earthquake.

Nationwide, one in nine bridges is structurally deficient, according to the Transportation for America, a DC-based advocacy group that urges government leaders to invest in infrastructure projects. According to this group, the I-5 bridge is not structurally deficient and not a top priority for investment.

ODOT's own *Bridge Condition Report* concurs with this assessment. They give both the northbound bridge, built in 1916, and the southbound bridge, built in 1958, a structural rating of "Fair", or equivalent to a 3 on a 5 point scale. They are not listed as structurally deficient.

Other bridges – and other critical infrastructure – require seismic readiness before the I-5 bridge. It should not be the regional priority.

Original Safety Concerns	Current Information
Current Issue: One car crash each day in the five mile CRC project area, including the bridge and interstate into Washington and Oregon. 25% of these accidents occur on the bridge itself.	The I-5 Bridge is not the most dangerous in the region. - Fremont: 1.53 crashes/ million vehicle miles - Marquam: 0.90 crashes / million vehicle miles - I-5: 0.88 crashes /million vehicle miles
Current Issue: Pathways and sidewalks expose cyclists and pedestrians to traffic noise, dust, debris and fumes, and are too narrow for multiple users. Areas leading to the bridge lack bike lanes or sidewalks, possibly endangering cyclists and pedestrians.	Bike and pedestrian advocates have raised concerns that the proposed design is dark and unwelcoming, and that the multi-block spiral "on ramp" will be difficult for many riders.
Future Issue: The CRC has claimed that "without key improvements in the project area, the number of crashes could double."	This is based on the assumption that travel over the bridge will increase significantly over the coming decades. Recent analysis shows low growth.
Seismic Readiness: Advocates for the CRC have claimed that the existing bridge cannot withstand the region's next big earthquake.	ODOT's data show there are more than two dozen bridges in Oregon in worse shape than the I-5 Bridge, including the Marquam Bridge over the Willamette River.

A regional seismic and disaster readiness plan should account for many considerations, including: number of people harmed if infrastructure fails; the use of the asset in facilitating response and recovery after the event; and, interdependency with other vital assets after the event.

An agency-by-agency approach to identifying which bridges, schools, hospitals, and emergency response facilities most need investment is insufficient for state or regional decision-making. However, in this case, ODOT's own seismic report identified other bridges that need seismic readiness investment before the I-5 bridge, and also many other projects where investment would be more valuable for the region and state.

4. ALTERNATIVE PLANS

Voting against the "Oregon Only" plan now is not a vote against finding a solution to the I-5 bridge concerns. Instead, it gives decision-makers time to examine the alternatives in light of current information. Federal funding does not require a quick decision for a project of this magnitude.

There is no easy fix for a complex regional problem such as this. Alternatives to the CRC that better meet our shared interests will require due diligence, engineering, environmental assessment, and community engagement. The purpose of this report is not to back one of these alternative plans or offer a new proposal.

Instead, we aim to share the facts as they are commonly understood, in one place, where decision-makers can digest them and use facts and clear information to negotiate next steps.

"Now or never" and "take it or leave it" are not the philosophies of governance or management strategies best suited to this kind of massive public project. **The new data presented in this report show that, with high financial risk, decreased travel need, and low urgency for mitigating safety issues, the Columbia River is a massive project that can withstand a slower pace of decision-making.** The new data show that we can take a step back, measure twice and cut once.

II. Taxpayer Risk

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT AND TAXPAYER BURDEN OF THE "OREGON ONLY" PLAN

The new "Oregon Only" proposal introduces new costs and new risks to Oregon tax payers. It is not clear from the CRC's financial plan that the toll revenue for the project will be sufficient and timely to pay both the amortization of the bond debt for the project and also the costs to operate the bridge tolling agency.

The risk to taxpayers exists on three fronts:

1. Increased debt service for a transportation agency that spends almost 30% of Oregon revenue to service current debt obligations.
2. A debt level that may result in seeing the state's AAA credit rating decreased, which would increase interest rates.
3. Commitment to current debt that would limit the state's ability to take on other important projects.

These risks exist because project cost has significant potential to increase, the toll revenue may come in short, and the timing of the bridge completion is uncertain. While each of these problems may be surmountable on its own, all three together represent an almost insolvable problem.

The CRC's financial plan relies on assumptions about three things: (1) ability to contain costs during construction, (2) federal support, and (3) revenue from tolling. The most recent financial statements from ODOT show a plan to spend $2.79 billion on the project, and a plan to raise $2.71 billion, showing an $86 million dollar shortfall.

ODOT has created a plan that contains many unknowns. The back-up plan, if costs are higher than anticipated, or if Federal grants, loans, or tolling (or all three) are lower than anticipated, is to increase tolls, reduce or eliminate other transportation projects in the state, and use general obligation bonds and borrowing against declining future gas tax revenue as a safety net. Although raising taxes has not been mentioned in the CRC proposal, it is a likely third option for fully funding this project.

1. **Costs may be higher than projected.** At a national level, projects of this size and complexity regularly see cost overruns of a third or more. And in Oregon, ODOT's recent management of major projects has also seen cost overruns, sometimes of more than three times the original project budget.

2. **Revenue may be lower than projected.** There is no guarantee that Federal FTA or TIFIA money will be available, or will be available at the levels proposed by ODOT. Recent independent traffic projects commissioned by the CRC predict that traffic may decline significantly on the tolled bridge, resulting in decreased revenue, and at the same time, that a large percentage of vehicles traveling over the bridge from Washington (a smaller but still significant share from other states) may never pay a toll at all because of the tolling mechanism design.

CRITICAL CONCERNS

TOLL REVENUE
LEGAL ISSUES & LOWER TRAFFIC PROJECTIONS

COST OVERRUNS
TAXPAYERS RESPONSIBLE FOR LIKELY COST OVERRUNS

FEDERAL SUPPORT
NO URGENT DEADLINE FOR ONGOING FUNDING PROGRAM

Over the last decade, ODOT's debt service has increased from 1.4% to 30%.

In addition to the challenges presented by ODOT's financial plan, there is reason to be concerned with ODOT's finances generally. As ODOT director Matthew Garrett wrote in a memo to the Oregon House Interim Committee on Transportation and Economic Development, "Long-term funding challenges will leave ODOT struggling to preserve and improve the transportation system." Over the last decade ODOT's debt-service as a percentage of its Oregon revenue has increased from 1.4% to almost 30%. While this plan would provide ODOT with temporary cash flow in the form of new loans, it would increase the struggling agency's financial exposure.

Project Expenses as of 11/2013 (Source: ODOT)	Millions
Replacement bridge and approaches	$1094.8
Demolition of existing bridge	$78.5
Highway - other than bridge construction/ demolition costs	$695.1
Transit - other than bridge construction/ demolition costs	$709.9
Bicycle/Pedestrian improvements	$37.6
Toll Bond Issuance Cost, Capitalized Interest, Bond Reserves	$32.7
Interim Borrowing Costs	$63.1
Bridge height mitigation	$86.4
TOTAL EXPENSE	**$2798.1**

Capital Revenues as of 11/2013 (Source: ODOT)	Millions
ODOT Previously Committed Funds	$57.9
WSDOT Previously Committed Funds	$49.9
ODOT Contribution	$450.0
GO Bonds repaid with highway fund revenues	*$382.0*
Formula Federal funds	*$68.0*
Toll-funded Sources	$1304.1
TIFIA Loan, repaid with toll revenues	*$900.0*
Toll Revenue Bonds	*$174.5*
Pre-completion toll proceeds	*$229.6*
FTA New Starts Funds	*$850.0*
TOTAL REVENUE	**$2711.9**

The ODOT contribution represents funding that is fungible for other projects statewide.

May apply in any year for a TIFIA loan for infrastructure improvements.

May apply in any year for an FTA grant award for transit projects (bus rapid transit, commuter rail, etc.)

1. Federal Support

The CRC's financial plan depends on significant support from the federal government in the form of three sources: A grant from the FTA for the light rail part of the project; A loan from the TIFIA for state highway improvements, backed by tolls; Annual highway "formula funds" that are regularly used for highway maintenance. **None of these sources are currently guaranteed.**

None of the federal funding sought for this project is constrained by an upcoming deadline. The funding is all offered through ongoing federal grant or loan programs to support state infrastructure and economic development.

FTA "NEW STARTS" FUNDING: $850M

The CRC assumes that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) will provide $850 million to cover 90% of the light rail portion of the project. The FTA generally provides half of the cost of similar projects. The FTA contribution could be substantially less than the $850 million that the CRC intends to ask for, as it was recently when TriMet asked for funding for the Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail project.

The CRC is betting on the higher level of support for two reasons: (1) A rider in a 2009 appropriation bill that might allow the CRC to count the highway portion of the project as a match for the light rail portion, which would be highly unusual; (2) An understanding that the FTA is strongly interested in multi-state projects.

The CRC has not developed a secondary source of funding if the FTA does not fully fund the light rail part of the project. In Oregon the state highway funding cannot be used to finance public transit.

TIFIA LOAN: $900M

Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program provides Federal credit assistance in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and standby lines of credit to finance surface transportation projects of national and regional significance. The TIFIA support sought by the CRC is a loan that is backed by toll revenue with a 35 year repayment period with a non-amortizing balloon payment.

FEDERAL FORMULA FUNDS: $68M

Federal funds for state-level infrastructure development and highway maintenance are a critical part of the ODOT budget. In 2011-13 ODOT expected to receive $998M in federal funding. If other funding falls short, ODOT has proposed increasing the portion of the CRC budget to be paid from Federal formula funds. This would directly impact ODOT's ability to complete other projects around the state.

FEDERAL FUNDING PROGRAMS SNAPSHOT

FTA NEW STARTS GRANTS

This is Federal Transit Administration's primary grant program for funding major transit capital investments, including rapid rail, light rail, bus rapid transit, commuter rail, and ferries. Annual grants have been made since 2000. Funding authority was renewed for this program in 2012.

National Funding Pot:

- FY 2013 grants: $1.9 billion
- FY 2014 grants: $1.9 billion

TIFIA LOANS

The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program provides Federal credit assistance in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and standby lines of credit to finance surface transportation projects of national and regional significance.

Estimated 3.85% interest on 35 year loan.

2. Containing Costs

The national trend for major public projects such as the CRC shows that they routinely see cost overruns by a third or more. For the CRC, this would mean that Oregon taxpayers would be asked to cover a billion dollar shortfall. By way of comparison, that is 1/3 of ODOT's overall budget, or 1/6 of the 2013 education budget for the state.

In Oregon, several recent projects have exceeded budget by more than twice the original estimate. ODOT's largest current project – the Pioneer Mountain - Edyville highway realignment on highway 20 – is currently on track to be

The national trend for major public projects shows that they routinely see cost overruns by a third or more.

delivered seven years late and nearly $300 million above the original budget of $110 million. The Grand Avenue Viaduct increased from $31M to $98M; Newberg-Dundee Bypass increased from $222M to $752M.

A cost overrun of this scale on the CRC would put the project in the $6-7 billion range. This would be similar to the SF-Oakland Bay Bridge, completed at $6.4 Billion, three times the original budget of $2.3 Billion projected in 2003.

ODOT recognizes the risk of the project costs exceeding the budget. Other than increasing tolls (discussed below), ODOT's strategies for addressing cost overruns include:

1. Diverting additional funds from the state highway budget.
2. Divert additional funds from the Federal highway formula funds for regular ODOT services.
3. Issue additional bonds, if ODOT has the cash to service the debt.
4. Wait on specific parts of the project until new revenue is available.

Although ODOT does not include raising taxes as one of the possible strategies for funding the project, doing so many be necessary in future legislative sessions.

3. Revenue from Tolling

The CRC has developed a variable-rate tolling program. Their current estimated peak hour tolls will be $3.25-$5.02 each direction, or as much as $10.04 for a round trip in 2022.

"I cannot overstate the importance of a legally enforceable tolling agreement with Washington that includes clear authority for Oregon to establish tolls, surcharges and late fees over the life of the bonds . . . before an Oregon-led project could be considered financially viable." - Treasurer Ted Wheeler

Nearly half of the current plan relies on toll revenue – primarily to pay back loans for upfront construction costs. If that $1.3 billion in projected toll revenue is inaccurate due to lower than expected traffic or un-collectable tolls from out of state drivers, Oregon taxpayers will bear the burden of paying higher taxes, higher tolls, or carrying a larger debt burden of general obligation bonds

The plan anticipates two, modern "barrier-free" tolling mechanisms. The first, like an E-Z Pass system, will require regular commuters to purchase a transponder, pre-pay, and have tolls deducted from their account.

The second system will photograph license plates, match them with drivers through their state systems, and send them a bill. This second system is expensive to operate, however it was chosen in order to keep traffic flowing over the bridge instead of creating a tolling bottleneck.

ODOT anticipates that a percentage of the drivers without a transponder will never pay. Further they anticipate that commercial drivers, who are often hired as contractors, will have little incentive to pay the toll – and will either take the toll-free route on I-205, or will fail to respond to bills. While ODOT has included these losses in the overall budget they are guesses based on traffic projections that have already been shown to be inaccurate. It would be more prudent to base the multi-billion dollar highway project on data from 2-5 years of tolling the existing bridge.

TOLL REVENUE BASED ON FAULTY TRAFFIC PROJECTIONS

Toll revenue is projected based on estimates of traffic for the region. If recently released data bears out, the CRC will see declining traffic flow in the coming decade because of a mix of both construction avoidance and toll avoidance. The CRC consultant CDM Smith projects that as many as 50,000 vehicles will divert from the CRC to I-205 to avoid tolls.

Impacts of Tolls on I-5 Traffic

[Source: CDM Smith for CRC]



CRC Tolling Pushes Traffic to I-205

Bridge	2012	2022	Change
I-5	124,000	85,000	-39,000
I-205	140,000	191,000	+51,000
TOTAL	264,000	276,000	+12,000

Projections created by the CRC consultant CDM Smith show that tolling the I-5 bridge could move as many as 51,000 vehicles per day to I-205 by 2022, while cutting I-5 traffic by 39,000 vehicles per day.

The CDM Smith projections show a grim picture for toll collection in the coming decade.

- Since 2002, Annual Average Daily Traffic has flatlined on I-5 to 0.0 % growth and on I-205 to 0.3% growth. The tolling plan would require significant traffic increases to cover both the costs of operating the tolling facility and paying off construction loans and bonds.
- CDM Smith confirms that tolling will result in a decline in traffic on I-5. Their analysis is that after 50,000 daily vehicles move to I-205, congestion on that bridge will be sufficient to drive traffic back to I-5.
- CDM Smith confirms that the new 12-lane highway and bridge will be underused. According to the IGA, in 2036, the new bridge will carry 109,000 vehicles, or 15,000 fewer vehicles than it carries today.

ODOT director Matthew Garrett discusses the risk of managing toll revenue is his September 2013 letter to Oregon Treasurer Ted Wheeler. ODOT's solutions include:

1. Create a "stabilization reserve fund" which will not increase income for the project, but will mitigate the year-to-year cash flow issues associated with lower toll revenues.
2. Increase tolls. This may generate more revenue, but at a significant expense to commuters, and an increase in the likelihood of traffic diversion to I-205. Increasing tolls on bridges in Washington state has been politically difficult.
3. Hire a consultant to monitor the tolling revenue. This would not

increase revenue, but would ensure that trends and fluctuations in toll revenue were being correctly observed in a timely way.

LEGAL & FINANCING ISSUES

Oregon's ability to collect tolls from non-Oregon drivers remains a legal grey area for the project. The State of Oregon does not have the authority to hold out-of-state vehicle owners who fail to pay tolls accountable.

Because the planned tolling system does not require on-the-spot payment, but instead photographs license plates and sends drivers a bill, it is likely that many drivers will simply never pay. For drivers from other states or foreign countries, extracting tolls would be impractical. For local drivers, the toll collectors' best accountability measure is the threat of putting a hold on the driver's vehicle registration renewal. Washington has not currently agreed to do this for Washington auto owners.

Without legislative action by Washington, Oregon has no legally enforceable way to collect tolls from Washington drivers, who are projected to be the majority of potential drivers.

Furthermore, Washington State has not yet granted Oregon the sole authority to raise tolls. If cost overruns or toll revenue result in a budget shortfall for the project, Oregon cannot unilaterally raise tolls to make up the difference

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

In the original Washington-Oregon plan, Washington state's existing, experienced tolling program held full responsibility for managing and operating the tolling system on the bridge. Oregon does not have this experience. In order to move forward, Oregon will need to create a new government toll collecting capability. Current estimates shows that creating this agency could cost more than $50 million, which is not included in the most recent "Oregon Only" plan for the CRC.

Toll operation is not a cut-and-dry government revenue source. As only the most recent in a series of high-profile toll projects that have run into financial trouble, the Foothill-Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency, which runs 39 miles of toll roads in Orange County, California, is said to be on the verge of default.

New York State Department of Transportation

The current Tappan Zee Bridge project in New York offers a corollary for the project. Standard & Poor's dropped the rating for the local transportation agency from A-plus to A, because they lacked of a compelling tolling plan with the possibility of lower traffic levels.

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

Outlook for US toll roads revised to stable from negative

New York, December 04, 2013 -- Moody's Investors Service is changing its outlook on the US toll road industry to stable from negative. The stable outlook is based on the view that the small but steady increase in traffic for toll roads in 2013 will continue in 2014.

"The rate of traffic growth is slowing down overall and so the slower, albeit more stable growth rates reflect a 'new normal,'" says Maria Matesanz, a Moody's Senior Vice President.

ODOT Debt Service Crisis

Since 2002, Oregon has become increasingly dependent on debt financing to pay for transportation projects. A decade ago, ODOT transportation projects were funded with a "pay as you go" strategy. As a result, the department previously spent 1.4% of its annual gross revenue servicing debt. But ODOT's debt service load is now nearly 30% of its gross revenue.

ODOT recognizes that it has an unstable and unsustainable business model with declining gas tax revenue in Oregon over the last decade. ODOT also recognizes that the debt service it pays annually as a result of borrowing for the Oregon Transportation Investment Act (OTIA) the Jobs and Transportation Act (JTA) between 2003 and 2009, is a huge burden for the state, threatening its ability to maintain highways and complete new projects.

ODOT director Matthew Garrett summarizes the situation plainly:

"Increasing demands on the state highway fund without providing new revenue sources will have a negative impact on the Department's ability to use bonding to fund other capital transportation projects. In addition, the lack of new revenues to offset the additional debt service commitment for the I-5 bridge will eventually place additional pressures on the Department's available cash balances. Given that cash liquidity is an important credit rating factor, there is concern that the Highway User Tax Revenue Bond program will no longer to be able to maintain its "AAA" credit rating. In the eventuality that the Highway User Tax Revenue Bond program is downgraded, the result will be higher interest rate costs and reduce debt capacity for a given revenue stream."

"The lack of new revenues to offset the additional debt service commitment for the I-5 bridge will eventually place additional pressures on the Department's available cash balances. " - ODOT Director, Matthew Garrett

Some may argue that, if the CRC financial plan results in a tolling system that pays for itself and for all of the debt amortization over time, the project is effectively "free" to taxpayers because the government can borrow at a lower interest rate than inflation.

However, debt for the state is not, in fact, free. It comes with both opportunity costs and access costs. This has been made clear by the ODOT director's assertion in 2011 that the agency's current debt service obligation hinders the agency's ability to also pay for projects, and by his admission that the CRC obligations may result in downgrading Oregon's credit rating.

CRITICAL CONCERNS

AIRPORT
HUB FOR HIGH TECH, MANUFACTURING & RETAIL

ROSE QUARTER
NEW CONGESTION IN THE HEART OF PORTLAND & EAST-WEST CONNECTORS

HEALTH SERVICES
TIME-SENSITIVE DELIVERIES TO DOZENS OF LOCAL HOSPITALS AND CLINICS

The CRC creates new traffic congestion in two parts of the city that are important to business interest: PDX and the Rose Quarter.

III. Business Impact

The CRC claims the project will protect and expand the regional economy. The focus of this argument has been the number of trucks that cross the Columbia River each day, and the value of the goods they carry and the jobs that they represent in warehouses, distribution centers, and for timber, agriculture, and other industries.

According to the 2005 study cited by the CRC, "The Cost of Congestion to the Economy of the Portland Region," congestion was a major issue for business leaders at that time, and was projected to become an increasingly urgent issue in the region. The business leaders interviewed for the study described why investments in transportation that reduce congestion are "fundamental to preserving the region's ability to compete in national and global markets."

However, as the "Cost of Congestion" study shows, **the legitimate need of local businesses to mitigate traffic congestion is not entirely aligned with the current project plan.**

Travel & Deliveries Move East-West more than North-South

Key transportation needs for both traded companies (which require out of state transportation imported and exported goods) and local-serving industries (such as Fred Meyer, health services, and utilities) focus on the importance of moving goods, services, and people east and west, through downtown, and to the airport. The "Cost of Congestion" study points to three key systems for connecting regional traded industries with global markets: I-5 and I-205 connecting to the north and south, the Port connecting with Asian markets, and PDX connecting the city globally.

The study offered a prioritized assessment of regional congestion, with a focus on eighteen congested highway links. Four area of significant concern were:

1.East-West travel on Highways 26 and 217. Cited by the majority of businesses surveyed.

2.Congestion on Highways 224/212. Cited by majority of businesses on this roadway.

3.I-5 and I-205. A challenge for north-south facilities.

4.Wilsonville and the I-5/I-84 exchange. Major choke points.

While the CRC partially addresses one of these concerns, it may exacerbate current congestion in the other areas, and **create new traffic congestion in two parts of the city that are equally important to business interests**: the airport and south of the Rose Quarter/downtown Portland.

21ST CENTURY ECONOMY NEEDS THE AIRPORT

Anything that increases congestion on I-84 or I-205 increases traffic congestion around the airport. For local high tech and creative industries, delays around the airport represent significant business costs. The port and airport are fundamental to connecting Oregon's inland areas to global markets.

Many business identified the "window" for both local and regional freight

movement and deliveries as an ever-shrinking target. According to that study, Intel moved their last daily shipment time up two hours for outbound shipments through PDX because of increased afternoon congestion. "A missed flight affects production around the globe and can result in costly operational changes," the report says.

The region's largest air imports by value are office and computer equipment, electronic machinery, scientific instruments and telecom equipment. Exports by value include transport equipment, chemical materials, fresh produce, in addition to high-tech machinery, instruments and electronic equipment. In addition, regional wholesaling, which accounted for approximately 60,000 jobs in 2005, is a significant part of the regional economy *in part because of access to the airport*. The airport is key for products that are high in value and low in weight, but also for business travel that is not a product – movement of key personnel.

PDX is reliant on the local highway system to move goods and passengers to and from the airport. Congestion on I-84 and I-205 represent major challenges for the airport. The current projection that as many as 50,000 cars will be diverted from I-5 to I-205 daily raises serious questions for the impact of the CRC on traffic to the airport.

Traveling from west Portland to the airport which can take as little as 20 minutes during the night regularly takes an hour or more in that late afternoon. Adding diverted traffic from I-5 due to tolls will make timely access to the airport from the "silicon forest" nearly impossible.

CONGESTION SOUTH OF THE ROSE QUARTER

Many urban planners and the Governor's Independent Review Panel of the CRC have raised the question of how the CRC will impact Portland neighborhoods and business south of the five mile project area, including at the Rose Quarter. The Independent Review Panel warned that increased Rose Quarter congestion "threatens the viability of the project." This is because the Rose Quarter is the convergence of three major arterials: I-5, I-84, and 405, which connect NW industrial areas, north-south traffic within Portland, and east-west traffic within the greater metro region and to the airport.

The concerns about the Rose Quarter are complex. If the CRC is correct that traffic will increase dramatically over the next decade (despite the last decade of traffic trends) and that, therefore, more lanes on the bridge are needed – moving the bottleneck from the I-5 bridge south to the I-5/I-84 exchange doesn't remove the problem, it re-locates it. The City of Portland's commissioned study found that congestion moves to N. Albina.

This creates a new level of congestion that impacts a broader set of businesses – those that move freight, people, and services East-West, as well as those who move North-South.

On the other hand, if the new CDM Smith data are correct, one way to address congestion on both the I-5 bridge (and not significantly impact the I-5/I-84 exchange) would be tolling the existing bridge. Tolling the existing bridge is a fundamental part of the CRC revenue strategy (called pre-tolling). Testing out tolling for 2-5 years before investing in a major project might allow analysts to better understand the complex impacts that any tolling strategy might have on the three highways (I-5, I-205, and I-84), and congestion in key areas.

Estimated Drive Time to PDX from the West Side, will increase 2-3 times current rates.

Two major Industries that should be concerned by the CRC impact congestion

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC

Congestion impairs PGE's ability to dispatch regular customer service and repair crews, and also their ability to respond to emergency situations. Response times are critical for PGE to ensure safety of the public and their users, and to meet Public Utility Commission standards for utility effectiveness. Increases in driving time directly decreases on-site work time and reduces productivity.

HEALTH SERVICES

113,000 jobs

Health services are one of the largest employers in the region. Providence Health Systems logistics and warehousing supports one west-side hospital, two east-side hospitals, and a Newberg hospital. Additionally, they provide medical supplies to dozens of regional clinic operations. With almost half of the clinics they serve located on the West side, traffic delays and congestion can result in missed or late deliveries of urgent supplies. Larger hospitals require at least three deliveries daily. At 2005 traffic levels, deliveries from the centralized warehouse off I-84 to the Newberg hospital took up to four hours.

IV. Workforce Impact

CRITICAL CONCERNS

1,900 JOBS
INCREASE STATE CONSTRUCTION JOBS BY 1-3% OVER 2013

TRADE-OFFS
COST OVERRUNS MAY CUT OTHER STATEWIDE PROJECTS

A few labor groups in Oregon have supported the CRC because of the promise of construction-sector jobs over the 10 year period of the project. The Oregon economy is gradually recovering from recession and opportunities to create new local jobs are badly needed. However, several factors complicate the value of the CRC opportunity for workers. On the one hand, the CRC previously overstated the number of jobs that will be created by the project. On the other hand, little analysis has been done to see how many jobs might be created by leveraging available federal funds to take on a different set of smaller projects in other parts of the state.

The Opportunity

In the early years of the project, the CRC claimed it would bring 20,000 jobs to the region over ten years. A corrected analysis of the jobs forecast showed the project would likely bring, as the CRC now claims, "about 1,900 supported or sustained jobs per year of construction." While some of these jobs may be short-term and some may be long-term, the project will sustain about 1,900 workers in an average year for the duration of the project. In 2013, the Oregon Employment Department reports an annual average of about 73,000 construction jobs. If the CRC's recent estimates are correct, they would increase regional construction work by 1-3% over 2013 numbers, depending on other trends in the industry.

The Opportunity Costs

One reality of the CRC is that the financial plan includes moving state highway fund money to the project – away from other work around the state. Some of the 1,900 jobs provided by the CRC are jobs taken from other parts of the agency's work, potentially in other parts of the state. Further, if the CRC sees cost overruns or toll revenue falls short, ODOT's plan includes reducing other project work around the state. The most recent waiting list includes 109 projects, including widening Hwy 127, fixing the Rose Quarter congestion, and addressing congestion on the Sunrise Corridor.

Additionally, Oregon has not pursued the possibility of using FTA or TIFIA funds for other projects. A package of smaller construction projects in other parts of the state might be equally attractive to the federal agencies, and have a greater impact on the statewide economy, bringing jobs to lower-income and under-served areas.

Finally, little research has been done to identify jobs that would be lost or moved because of the project. The EIS estimates that 916 permanent jobs on Hayden Island and in Vancouver will be eliminated.

V. Land Use and Local Impacts

Local Communities Oppose Project

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

The Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods, a group of twelve neighborhoods in inner North and Northeast Portland, opposes the CRC plan based on the health impacts it would have on the communities surrounding the bridge and the highway south of it. (See below, in the section on air quality.)

DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES OF COLOR

The neighborhoods most likely to experience increased air pollution from idling vehicles in North and Northeast Portland and also in the neighborhoods surround I-205 are among the largest communities of color in Oregon. The Final Environmental Impact Statement record the populations of the effected neighborhoods in the Oregon as 27% racial or ethnic minorities (including caucasians identifying as Hispanic or Latino). However, the report also saw specific concentrations of 70% or greater of minority populations in 10 census block groups within the Boise, King, Humboldt, Piedmont, Eliot, Irvington and Woodlawn neighborhoods of Portland.

In a letter to CRC planners, the EPA raised the concern that "There was no indication (in the CRC environmental impact statement) of how these vulnerable populations might be impacted by air pollution, noise, diesel construction vehicles and increased traffic," referring to minority communities in North Portland.

Public Transit & Transportation Choices

One highlight of the CRC proposal has been a desire to include public transit on light rail and better options for cyclists and pedestrians. Increasing transportation options and public transit in the area is a goal for many residents of the region.

The CRC's estimates that about 450 people per day currently walk or ride their bikes across the I-5 bridge. Traffic noise, debris, and poor access points deter more people from doing so. The CRC estimates that as many as ten times more people would eventually cross the bridge on bike or on foot if the bridge and bridgeheads included better facilities for walking and cycling.

However, the current plan concerns bike, pedestrian, and public transit advocates. Cycling advocates view the current design (a bike path under the new highway) as dark, unwelcoming, and potentially dangerous.

Light rail advocates point out that the light rail project itself includes $176 million in infrastructure development on parking lots and changes to streets in Vancouver for a very small length of rail into the city. Further, they are concerned that the estimated 45 minute light rail ride into downtown Portland will be unattractive to commuters. The current commute by car or bus usually takes half that time.

Urban Sprawl and Livability

In the past 20 years, the pattern of development in Southwest Washington has been more favorable to rural residential sprawl. Sightline, an independent national research group, recently produced a map depicting where population growth has

CRITICAL CONCERNS

LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS
PROTEST AND CONCERN FOR THE CURRENT PLAN

COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
27% OF IMPACTED RESIDENTS ARE PEOPLE OF COLOR

LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
WALKING, CYCLING AND LIGHT RAIL OPTIONS CREATE COMMUNITY

occurred in the region between 2000 and 2010. As the map shows, population growth outside of the area's urban centers has been concentrated in Washington state.

This pattern of development is more car-dependent, more difficult to serve by rail transit, and deleterious to the goals of healthy sustainable communities. The current CRC proposal facilitates this development pattern. The project suggests that sprawl can be limited through tolling. However, this puts the proposal in the unusual position of overbuilding to facilitate cars, then tolling traffic to limit sprawl. Either the proposal is overbuilt or it will produce sprawl in Southwest Washington.

Exurban Population Growth, Metropolitan Portland, 2000-2010

Rural sprawl slowed on both sides of the Columbia after 2000. Yet Clark County's rural areas still saw substantial population growth over the decade, while Oregon's rural areas did not.



VI. Environmental Impact

EPA Approval Based on Incorrect Data

The EPA has approved the CRC plan and mitigation efforts proposed for a wide range of environmental impacts. However, the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) is based on the same traffic projection numbers that we now know to be the incorrect. This means the the FEIS, which looks at the difference between a "no build" scenario and the proposed plan to assess environmental impact, has an incorrect basis for comparison. The FEIS "no build" scenario is not an accurate prediction of a new normal. The FEIS views the CRC plan as an improvement over a "worst case scenario" for regional traffic increases and congestion around the bridge. But new data about traffic and congestion in the area show that this "worst case scenario" is not a likely outcome for the region. This does not mean that the CRC would be an improvement over a corrected "no build" assessment. However, the environmental impacts are currently being litigated.

The key concerns for local and regional residents are the likely impacts on air quality, water quality, and urban sprawl.

Air Quality

The neighborhoods around I-5 in North and Northeast Portland are a major center for health problems caused by environmental factors. They are among the most highly polluted in Portland, and are also among the most ethnically and economically diverse. Advocates for air quality and children's health have raised alarms that congestion caused first by the construction project itself, and then by shifting the I-5 bridge bottleneck south into a traffic jam in North Portland, will cause an increase in air pollution in a region that is already struggling with health concerns.

In the neighborhoods surrounding I-5, asthma rates are currently nearly double the national average. Fifteen toxins are currently on track to exceed national safety benchmarks by 2017. Cars and trucks emit benzene, a Class A carcinogen, which recently surpassed ten times the national benchmark in these neighborhoods. Heightened levels of diesel particulate-matter, associated with lung cancer, breathing ailments and heart problems have also been measured in the area.

Water Quality & Endangered Fish Habitat

The Final Environmental Impact Statement identifies several protected aquatic species found in the CRC project area, including endangered Chinook salmon, Sockeye salmon and Steelhead trout. The FEIS outlines mitigation efforts for the CRC to limit the short term and long term impacts of the project, and also limits the times during the year when construction work would harm fish stock, those provisions are based on the concept that the project *as a whole* is an environmental net benefit over the "no build" alternative.

If the FEIS is based on incorrect traffic projections for a "no build" alternative, it follows that the threshold for acceptable harm to endangered species is also based on a false definition of comparative of harm.

CRITICAL CONCERNS

AIR QUALITY
ASTHMA, CANCER AND LIFE EXPECTANCY IN N/NE PORTLAND

WATER QUALITY
ENDANGERED FISH HABITAT IN COLUMBIA RIVER

URBAN SPRAWL
DEVELOPMENT IN SUBURBAN WASHINGTON INCREASES

VII. Statewide Transit & Improvement

CRITICAL CONCERNS

STATEWIDE ODOT PROJECTS
PROJECTS CUT OR DELAYED DUE TO DEBT SERVICE

Diversion Estimates from Columbia River Crossing

Tags: Clackamas County, Columbia River Crossing

The **Clackamas County Board of Commissioners** wrote **Gov. John Kitzhaber** today with a warning: If they don't get good estimates on how tolling the **Columbia River Crossing** might affect Interstate 205, they'll **officially oppose the project.**

The letter (PDF), dated today, says the commissioners have asked Kitzhaber three

CLACKAMAS COUNTY
UNLIKELY FULL SUPPORT FROM FEDERAL PROGRAMS

"We have grave concerns about a funding strategy for the Columbia River Crossing that prioritizes it above all other regional transportation investments." – Clackamas County Letter, May 20, 2010

Clackamas County

In 2006, Clackamas County signed on to early agreements toward building the CRC only with the condition that both the I-5 and I-205 bridges be tolled simultaneously. This requirement was based on the assumption that tolling on only one bridge would increase traffic on the other bridge, especially for regular commuters and commercial freight.

Current models from the Investment Grade Analysis contracted by the CRC predict that tolling on I-5 will cause traffic to increase by 51,000 vehicles per day on I-205 in Clackamas County, while I-5 traffic will decline to levels far below current usage. On December 5th, 2013, the Clackamas County Board of Commissioners renewed their commitment to seeing the project address traffic, congestion, and tolling as a regional issue.

NOW THEREFORE, the Clackamas County Board of County Commissioners resolves as follows:

1. Clackamas County urges its State and Federal legislative delegations to require an updated and thorough evaluation of the effect that tolling the CRC will have on all of Interstate 205 in Oregon before any tolling plan is approved.

2. Before approval of any financing plan that includes tolls, Clackamas County urges its State and Federal legislative delegations to require a system-wide approach to the CRC that includes a plan to mitigate the impact that CRC tolling will have on the Oregon portion of Interstate 205.

Adopted this 5th Day of December, 2013

CLACKAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Chair

Recording Secretary

Statewide Projects

"We don't want a flawed project in this one corner of the state to disproportionately reduce or eliminate worthy transportation projects in other parts of the state because it gobbles up all the available infrastructure funds." – Metro Councilor Bob Stacey

The CRC presents a direct opportunity cost for other transportation projects in the state. With overwhelming debt service obligations, declining gas tax revenue, and a decade-long increase in the cost of construction costs, ODOT has had to make difficult decisions about where and how to invest in construction projects. Given the CRC's reliance on the state's bonding capacity, valuable transportation projects across the state will become impossible to finance. Other projects that will be delayed include safety improvements, sidewalk construction, and projects that benefit rural economies.

ODOT director Matthew Garrett set the troubled agency's direction in 2011, "focusing on its base mission of maintaining and preserving the highway system, investing scarce resources strategically to minimize the deterioration

of the system," and advising the state that "the bulk of the reductions will fall on ODOT's project delivery arm, which will shrink by about 30 percent."

While these difficult cuts are being made to project delivery, ODOT has also proposed supporting the CRC with scarce, fungible federal formula dollars. Because of the complexity of ODOT's state funding strategies and debt obligations, Garrett has identified these dollars as "the exclusive funding source for construction projects."

What this all means, in short, is that the CRC will require ODOT to invest scarce federal dollars in the mega-project at a time when all other projects are being cut. And, since one of ODOT's solutions for a potential cost overrun on the CRC is to move more federal dollars to that project, it is likely that additional projects will be cut in future years to finance the CRC.

VIII. Interests and Options



UPDATED TRAFFIC DATA
OLDER DATA AND ESTIMATES ARE NOT ACCURATE.



SEEKING COMPARISONS
THE MILLAU VIADUCT COMPLETED IN 2003. $400M EUROS.



INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
INDEPENDENT PLANNERS HAVE PROPOSED SIMPLE OPTIONS

"The fix needs to be a technical, engineering, design, planning, financial fix – not another sales job. We need Plan B, not more unending promotion and defense of a Plan A which has failed to pan out." – David Bragdon, former Metro President (2010)

The purpose of this report is to urge legislators to vote against the current "Oregon Only" plan and to lay out the key interests and concerns for the region. Our purpose is not to present new research or a new solution.

The current investment of both years and funds in the development of the project is a reflection of the complexity of the project. Any new solution or package of solutions will require engineering, environmental impact assessment, and a process for engaging communities toward a regional plan. But that doesn't mean that we should say "good enough" and move ahead – it means that we should value our previous investment by continuing to work until we have a plan that is supported by both states, all local governments, and the federal government, and is financially viable, environmentally responsible, and creates living wage jobs.

The following alternative plans, concepts, and mitigation proposals are offered in the spirit of providing a full view of the range of options before the state.

1. Toll the current I-5 bridge at key times or at all hours to reduce traffic and generate revenue. The current CRC plan calls for "pre-tolling" the existing bridge. This could work in a similar way, but with the intention of using the "pre-tolling" to study the impacts on traffic patterns and help inform a next phase of bridge, interchange, Rose Quarter and I-205 project development.

2. Toll the existing I-205 bridge at key times or all hours to reduce traffic and generate revenue. This might work in the same way as tolling the I-5 bridge. It would require changing the recent Washington decision to make tolling I-205 illegal.

3. Build a new eight-lane highway bridge immediately upstream of the current Interstate Bridge and repurpose the Interstate Bridge as a two-lane local street, a light rail crossing and a pair of dedicated bicycle lanes.

4. Build a local bridge to Hayden Island to facilitate freight movement to and from the Port of Portland. *Proponents claim this would cost $100 million.*

5. Upgrade and realign the downstream railroad bridge, with a new center lift span. Proponents of this option estimate that it would eliminate some bridge lifts on the I-5 bridge, one of the major causes of local congestion. *Proponents claim this would cost $100 million.*

6. Together, items 3-5 above have been proposed as a complete alternative plan. *Proponents claim it would cost $950 million.*

7. Install a modern lift system on the current I-5 bridge. While the bridge itself has been evaluated as structurally sound, and other infrastructure in the region is not, some are still concerned about the bridge lift mechanism.

8. Seismic upgrade to bring existing bridge up to a "no collapse" standard. *Estimated by CRC to be $200 million.*

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